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Abstract
We describe a distributed framework for resources management in peer-to-peer networks leading to
“golden-rule” reciprocity, a kind of one-versus-rest tit-for-tat, so that the delays experienced by any given
peer’s messages in the rest of the network are proportional to those experienced by others’ messages at
that peer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a networked group of peers1 handling queries. In this paper, we consider a cooperative
group of peers operating, e.g., in support of a content-distribution system [4], [2] or a social net-
work [6]. Our framework is similar to the cooperative Jackson-network model of [16] whose aim
is to minimize delays, however we assume that the peers act in distributed/decentralized fashion
[15]. We also assume that the aim of all peers is to achieve “golden-rule” reciprocity where the
service capacity they allocate to foreign/transit queries results in delay that is proportionate to
that experienced by exogenous (local) queries entering the network at that node.
This note is organized as follows. We motivate and set-up the problem in Section II. Our
solution for golden-rule reciprocity is given in Section III. We discuss distributed computation
of an eigenvector problem associated with the solution in Section IV. In Section V, a numerical
example is given and we conclude with mention of future work in Section VI.
This work was supported in part by NSF CNS grant 1152320.
1Alternatively, a peer may be called a user or station, or, in the context of a network graph, a peer may be called a node or
vertex.
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2II. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM SET-UP
We assume queries randomly forwarded so it’s possible that a query may be forwarded back to
its originating peer. Random forwarding in this manner may occur under “onion” routing [1] for
purposes of privacy protections. For example, suppose that two peers i and j that are connected
(cf., ri,j, rj,i > 0) share a private, symmetric cryptographic key ki,j, e.g., [11]. Suppose when i
sends a query directly to j, and j forwards the query with j’s return address, i.e., j acts as i’s
proxy - so, it’s possible that a peer later relaying this query will send it to back to i (as a query).
A. Flow-balance for Randomized Forwarding
A peer may have need to match a query to a cache of previously handled queries [6] or using
some other type of forwarding-information base; thus queries may take a variable amount of
time to process. Each network peer i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is assumed to have a limited ability to
service queries, herein modeled by i.i.d. exponentially distributed service times with mean 1/µi.
Peers not only consider their query burden (or those of their clients), for peer i modeled as
external arrival process with mean rate λ0,i, but also relay/resolve queries on behalf of a much
larger population of peers.
Each peer can also control to which other peers it forwards queries which it cannot resolve.
Assume that peer i can resolve a query with probability ri,0.
Suppose that the graph is connected so that the network is stable, i.e., there exists a set of
routing parameters rij ≥ 0 such that the solution of flow-balance equations
Λi = λ0,i +
N∑
j=1
Λjrj,i, with 1 =
N∑
j=0
ri,j,
such that Λi < µi for all i, where rij = 0 if i and j are not directly connected. Defining the
N × N routing matrix R = [ri,j] for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N and identity matrix I , we can collectively
write the the flow-balance equations as
Λ′(I − R) = λ′
0
⇒ Λ′ = λ′
0
B, where
B = [bi,j ] := (I − R)−1, i.e., Λi =
N∑
j=1
bj,iλ0,j ∀i.
We assume that R is strictly sub-stochastic (not all ri,0 are zero) so that I −R is non-singular.
Note that since R ≥ 0 (a non-negative matrix with all entries ri,j ≥ 0) then also
B = (I − R)−1 = I +R +R2 +R3 + ... ≥ 0. (1)
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3Note that bi,i ≥ 1, i.e., Λi ≥ λ0,i (again, some queries may return (as queries) to their originating
peer).
B. Queues for Local and Foreign Queries at each Peer
Each peer i has two queues, one for its local load
bi,iλ0,i
and one for its foreign load Λi − bi,iλ0,i, respectively served at rates
µ0,i > bi,iλ0,i and µi − µ0,i > Λi − bi,iλ0,i, ∀i, (2)
where we have made an implicit assumption of queue stability on the available service ca-
pacities µi, µ0,i. These two queues are effectively multiplexed before forwarding to peers in
{0, 1, 2, ..., N} because, for simplicity of exposition herein, we assume the same forwarding
probabilities r for both queues of a given peer.
Note that this can be easily generalized to different forwarding probabilities for the local and
foreign load of a given peer, with good reason from a modeling perspective; e.g., a peer may be
able to resolve (forward to peer 0) a local query with different probability than a foreign one.
C. The Jackson Network Model
Assuming Poisson external arrivals (again, at rates λ
0
) gives a Jackson network model with
2N queues. The mean number of local queries queued at peer i is
Li,i =
bi,iλ0,i
µ0,i − bi,iλ0,i
The mean number of queries in j’s foreign-traffic queue is
Lj :=
Λj − bj,jλ0,j
µj − µ0,j − (Λj − bj,jλ0,j)
The mean number of i’s jobs in j’s foreign-traffic queue is
Li,j :=
bi,jλ0,i
Λj − bj,jλ0,j ·
Λj − bj,jλ0,j
µj − µ0,j − (Λj − bj,jλ0,j)
=
bi,jλ0,i
µj − µ0,j − (Λj − bj,jλ0,j) .
May 15, 2018 DRAFT
4The mean delay (disutility) of foreign traffic at peer i is
1
µi − µ0,i − (Λi − bi,iλ0,i) .
Using Little’s theorem [17], we can write the disutility of (delay, cost to) peer i as a combination
of the total mean delay of peer i’s traffic and the mean local delay of foreign traffic at peer i
(of all other traffic), the latter modified by an “altruism” (cooperation) factor αi > 0:
Ci =
1
λ0,i
N∑
j=1
Li,j + αi
1
µi − µ0,i − (Λi − bi,iλ0,i)
=
bi,i
µ0,i − bi,iλ0,i +
∑
j 6=i
bi,j
µj − µ0,j − (Λj − bj,jλ0,j)
+ αi
1
µi − µ0,i − (Λi − bi,iλ0,i) .
III. OPTIMAL SERVICE ALLOCATIONS FOR GOLDEN-RULE RECIPROCITY
Fixing µj for all j, note how Ci also depends on µ0,j for all j 6= i, subject to (2). Solving the
first-order Nash equilibrium conditions with µ0,i the play actions:
∂Ci/∂µ0,i = 0 ∀i,
leads to the unique solution
µ∗
0,i =
√
bi,i√
bi,i +
√
αi
(µi − Λi) + bi,iλ0,i (3)
⇒ µi − µ∗0,i =
√
αi√
bi,i +
√
αi
(µi − Λi) + Λi − bi,iλ0,i.
Since Ci is concave in µ0,i for all i, µ∗
0
is the unique Nash equilibrium [14]. Thus, (2) holds
when all αi ∈ (0,∞), with mean delay diverging in the foreign queue as α ↓ 0 (i increasingly
selfish), and mean delay diverging in the local queue as α→∞ (i increasingly selfless).
A. Golden-Rule Reciprocity
Rather than exploring the efficiency of Nash equilibria according to a global “social welfare”
function (as in e.g., [8]), suppose we simply want a Nash equilibrium such that: for all peers i,
the mean delay experienced by i’s queries in the rest of the network is proportional to the the
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5mean delay in i’s foreign-traffic queue. That is, using µ
0
= µ∗
0
for all i, there is a constant κ
(constant across all peers) such that:
∀i,
∑
j 6=i
1 +
√
bj,j/αj
µj − Λj bi,j = κ
1 +
√
bi,i/αi
µi − Λi . (4)
Recall B := (I −R)−1 ≥ 0 by (1), and define a zero-diagonal version of B,
B˜ := B − diag{B} ≥ 0,
where diag{B} is the diagonal matrix with entries bi,i (i.e., those of B).
Lemma 3.1: If a square matrix R ≥ 0 is irreducible, then the following matrix is also non-
negative and irreducible:
(I −R)−1 − diag{(I − R)−1} =: B˜.
Proof: Clearly B˜ ≥ 0 by (1), i.e., since B := (I −R)−1 ≥ 0. Irreducibility is a property of
the off-diagonal elements of a matrix that are zero. B˜ is irreducible because
∀i 6= j, b˜i,j = (R +R2 +R3 + ...)i,j ≥ ri,j,
and R is irreducible by hypothesis.
Now since B˜ ≥ 0 is irreducible, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem [7] (see also Theorem 5, p. 9,
of [13]), there is a positive right-eigenvector v corresponding to a maximal eigenvalue (κ > 0)
of B˜, i.e., B˜v = κv as (4).
Clearly then, to achieve golden-rule reciprocity (4), each peer i should set their altruism
parameter such that
vi =
1 +
√
bi,i/αi
µi − Λi
⇒ ∀i, αi = bi,i(vi(µi − Λi)− 1)−2, (5)
which is feasible when ∀i, vi(µi − Λi) > 1, i.e.,
∀i, µi > v−1i + Λi. (6)
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6B. Summary
In our Jackson network setting, given the external demand λ
0
and assuming strictly sub-
stochastic R, and hence B˜ ≥ 0, are irreducible:
1) the total loads Λ are naturally computed in distributed fashion by flow-balance,
2) peers compute the strictly positive eigenvector v > 0 of B˜ in distributed fashion (cf., dis-
cussion below),
3) each peer allocates sufficient service capacity µ to achieve (6) (alternatively, if service
capacity µi of peer i is limited, then their demand λ0,i is reduced/thinned to achieve (6)),
4) each peer sets their altruism parameter α as (5), and
5) each peer sets their service allocations for their foreign and local queues according to (3).
IV. DISCUSSION: ACHIEVING GOLDEN-RULE RECIPROCITY IN
DISTRIBUTED/DECENTRALIZED FASHION
The routing information R could simply be shared among all the peers in the manner of
link-state routing based on Dijkstra’s algorithm [11]. Alternatively, Section 2 of [10] describes a
method for distributed computation of the principle eigenvector of a routing/graph matrix based
on orthogonal iteration and fast-mixing random walks [9]. Though the eigenvectors of R and
B = (I−R)−1 coincide, those of R and B˜ = B−diag{B} necessarily do not. To accommodate
B˜, we now specify a modification of the orthogonal iteration stated as Algorithm 1 of [10]
(where their Q = v > 0 and their A = B˜). Let Ω(v) be the normalization of v.
0: initialize B0 = I and v0 as a random, non-zero, and non-negative vector.
k: For step k > 0, do:
k.1: Bk = I +Bk−1R
k.2: vk = Ω((Bk − diagBk)vk−1)
k.3: If the change in v and B are not negligible, go to step k + 1, else stop.
Note that Bk converges to B = (I −R)−1 (again, R is strictly sub-stochastic by assumption).
The approach used for decentralized (ortho)normalization of Section 2.2 of [10], again based on
fast-mixing random walks [9], can also be used to update the B matrix in step k.1.
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7V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For a simple example network of three peers2 with routing probabilities
R =
1
6


0 2 3
2 0 3
3 1 0

⇒ B =


2.062 0.937 1.500
1.312 1.687 1.500
1.250 0.750 2.000

 ,
and maximum eigenvalue of B˜ := B − diag(B) is κ = 2.366 with associated positive right-
eigenvector
v = [0.576 0.641 0.507]′.
If exogenous loads are λ
0
= [1 2 1]′, then by flow-balance, total loads are
Λ′ := λ′
0
B := λ′
0
(I − R)−1 = [5.9 5.061 6.5].
Taking the service rates µ sufficiently large to satisfy (6), e.g., as
µ = [8 7 9]′ > [7.636 6.621 8.472]′ = v−1 + Λ,
the golden-rule cooperation parameters α are computed using (5):
α = [46.9 28.6 28.0]′
Finally, the bandwidth allocations for the local and foreign queues under golden-rule cooperation
according to (3) are, respectively,
µ
0
= [2.43 3.75 2.32]′
⇒ µ− µ
0
= [5.57 3.25 6.68]′
VI. FUTURE WORK
Variations of the disutilities Ci given above can be studied, possibly leading to similar golden-
rule reciprocity solution frameworks.
Also, it’s well known how peer-to-peer systems may experience degraded performance due
to various types of selfish behavior, see e.g., [5], [3]. Future work on this problem includes
consideration of how to police and mitigate defectors from golden-rule reciprocity, particularly
2Computed at http://www.bluebit.gr/matrix-calculator
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8in the process through which routing information R is shared among the peers and the maximal,
positive eigenvalue κ of is computed. That is, some peers may want their traffic to be treated
better by their peers than they themselves treat their peers’ traffic.
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